



(b)(3): 10 USC 424,
(b)(3): 50 USC 3024(i)

DoD Information Review Task Force-2: Initial Assessment

~~(S//NF)~~ Impacts Resulting from the Compromise of Classified Material
by a Former NSA Contractor



(b)(3): 10 USC
424, (b)(3): 50
USC 3024(i)

18 December 2013

Information Review Task Force-2
Defense Intelligence Agency

(b)(3): 10
USC 424

(b)(3): 10 USC 424
(b)(3): 50 USC 3024(i)

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(b)(1),1.4 (c)
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(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i),
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(U//FOUO) Annex G: Distribution39

(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC
3024(i),(b)(7)(A)

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(b)(3):10 USC 424,
(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

18 December 2013

(b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)
(3):50 USC 3024(i),1.4
(a),1.4 (c),1.4 (d),(b)(7)(A)

(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)
(3):50 USC 3024(i) **(U) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:**

(b)(1),1.4 (c) ~~(TS)~~ ~~(NF)~~ This report presents the Information Review Task Force-2's (IRTF-2's) initial assessment of impact to the Department of Defense (DoD) from the compromise of [REDACTED] classified files by a former National Security Agency (NSA) contractor. The IRTF-2 and Defense component partners continue triaging and reviewing the compromised information for Defense equities and will update this report as additional assessments are completed. Combatant Commands (CCMDs) and Services have produced separate reports that provide greater details concerning the potential impact of the compromise on their respective equities. We have included those available in the Annex. It should be noted that SIGINT-specific equities are not addressed in this report; NSA is reviewing those separately.

(b)(3):10 USC 424,
(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i) ~~(TS)~~ ~~(NF)~~ The IRTF-2 assesses with high confidence that the information compromise by a former NSA contractor [REDACTED] and will have a GRAVE impact on U.S. national defense.

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i),1.4 (c),1.4 (d)

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(b)(3):10 USC 424,
(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~

(U) BACKGROUND:

(b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i),1.4 (b)

~~(TS)~~ [redacted] ~~(NF)~~ [redacted] a former NSA contractor compromised [redacted] from NSA Net and the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS). On 6 June 2013, media groups published the first stories based on this material, and on 9 June 2013 they identified the source as an NSA contractor who had worked in Hawaii.

(b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i),1.4 (c)

- (U//~~FOUO~~) On 11 July 2013, LTG Flynn directed establishment of the Information Review Task Force 2 (IRTF-2) to acquire, triage, analyze, and assess all DIA and DoD compromised information.
- (U//~~FOUO~~) Since 11 July 2013, IRTF-2 has led a coordinated DoD effort to discover, triage, and assess the impact of non-NSA Defense material from NSA holdings of compromised data.

(U//~~FOUO~~) As of 18 December 2013, the federated IRTF-2 assessment community includes:

(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i),(b)(7)(A)

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~~NOFORN~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~

(b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i),(b)(7)(A),1.4 (c)

(U) IMPACT ASSESSMENT

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (a),1.4 (c),1.4 (d),(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i),(b)(7)(A)

(b)(1),1.4 (c),(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i),(b)(7)(A)

[Redacted]

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~~NOFORN~~


(b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i),(b)(7)
(A),1.4 (c),1.4 (d),1.4 (g)

Pages 13 thru 18 are
withheld in full and not
included.

(b)(3):10 USC
424,(b)(3):50
USC 3024(i)

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~~NOFORN~~



(b)(3):10
USC
424,(b)
(3):50
USC
3024(i)

~~(S//NF)~~ **U.S. Intelligence Capability**

~~(TS//NF)~~ The scope of the compromised knowledge related to U.S. intelligence capabilities is staggering.



(b)(1),(b)
(3):10
USC 424,
(b)(3):50
USC 3024
(i),(b)(7)
(A),1.4
(c),1.4
(d),1.4 (g)

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(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)
(3):50 USC 3024(i)

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~~NOFORN~~

Annex A: Terms of Reference

Chart Classified: ~~For Official Use Only~~

(b)(3): 10 USC 424, (b)
(3): 50 USC 3024(i)

Compromised: Out of Government Control

Disclosed: Made available to the public via the media, or to a foreign adversary

Person of Interest (POI): Term used to refer to former NSA contractor associated with leak of classified material; separation of impact assessment and investigation; use of term in briefings and correspondence limits legally discoverable information

Levels of Impact: Derived from Executive Order 12958 and

(b)(3): 10 USC
424, (b)(3): 50
USC 3024(i),
(b)(7)(A)

(U) By Classification Guidance ²

(U) The United States Classification system is currently established under Executive Order (EO) 12958, as amended, and has three levels of classification — Confidential, Secret, and Top Secret.

² Per Executive Order 12958,

(b)(3): 10 USC
424, (b)(3): 50
USC 3024(i)

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(b)(3): 10 USC 424, (b)
(3): 50 USC 3024(i)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~

(U) As specified in EO 12958, as amended, information may be classified at one of the following three levels:

- Top Secret shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause **exceptionally grave damage** to national security.
- Secret shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause **serious damage** to national security.
- Confidential shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause **damage** to national security.

(U) By CI Damage Definitions³

(U) Responsibility for national assessments was assigned to by the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 and reaffirmed by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004

(U) Four Major Categories

(b)(1),1.4 (c),(b)
(7)(A)

³ Per ONCIX;

(b)(3):10
USC 424,(b)
(3):50 USC
3024(i)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~

Pages 28 thru 31 are withheld in full and not included.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~

Annex D

(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)
(3):50 USC 3024(i)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~

(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)
(3):50 USC 3024(i)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~

Annex E

(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)
(3):50 USC 3024(i)

(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)
(3):50 USC 3024(i)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~

Pages 37 and 38 are withheld in full and not included.

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted] ~~NOFORN~~

Annex F

(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)
(3):50 USC 3024(i)

(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)
(3):50 USC 3024(i)

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted] ~~NOFORN~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~

Annex G: Distribution


Chart Classified: ~~For Official Use Only~~

(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)
(3):50 USC 3024(i)

Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security

Director for Intelligence, J2, Joint Staff

(b)(3):50
USC 3024(i)



(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)
(3):50 USC 3024(i)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~